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Recall that, for G a group, a finite subset F of G, and ǫ > 0, a finite subset H of G is called a (F, ǫ)-Følner set if, for all g ∈ F, we have that |gH△H| < ǫ|H|. If a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is an n-tuple from G, we refer to ({a 1 , . . . , a n }, ǫ)-Følner subsets of G as ( a, ǫ)-Følner subsets of G. The group G is said to be amenable if, for every finite subset F of G and every ǫ > 0, there is a (F, ǫ)-Følnet subset of G.
The following is the main result of our note: Theorem 1.0.1. There is n ∈ N, a finite system Σ( x, y) of equations and inequations having a solution in some group, where x has length n, and ǫ > 0 such that: for any group G and any a ∈ G n , if the system Σ( a, y) has a solution in G, then there is no ( a, ǫ)-Følner set in G.
We will actually prove something a bit more general, namely that the set of such systems is dense in a certain sense to be made precise below.
It is natural to ask whether or not such a system could actually be equivalent (in all groups) to the nonexistence of a Følner set. We will remark that, asymptotically (meaning for n large enough and ǫ small enough), no such system can exist.
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The proof of the main theorem follows in a rather straightforward way from the observation that no existentially closed (e.c.) group can be amenable together with some standard facts from model-theoretic forcing. For the sake of the reader not familiar with these concepts, we will review them below. We will however assume that the reader is familiar with some basic logic; an introduction aimed towards group theorists can be found in [9] .
We also take the opportunity to observe that e.c. groups cannot have some of the other mainstream properties studied in group theory nowadays, namely exactness, the Haagerup property, or property (T). We also take up the corresponding question for so-called locally universal groups and settle this question for some of these properties.
E
In the rest of this note, L denotes the language of groups and T denotes the L-theory of groups.
Preliminaries on existentially closed and locally universal groups.
Recall that a group G is said to be existentially closed (e.c.) if, for any finite system p( x) of equations and inequations with coefficients from G, if there is a solution to p( x) in an extension of G, then there is a solution to p( x) in G. (In modeltheoretic terms: if there is an existential L-formula ϕ( x) with parameters from G that is satisfiable in an extension of G, then ϕ( x) is satisfiable in G itself.)
It is useful to rephrase being e.c. in the following way: Proof. Suppose that G is a finitely generated group with solvable word problem and that H is a locally universal group; we show that G embeds into H. By a celebrated theorem of Higman and Boone [10, Theorem 7.4] , there is a finitely presented group K with a simple subgroup S such that G embeds into S. It thus suffices to show that S embeds into H. Let K = ( a | w) be a finite presentation of K, where a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ) and w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ). Fix s ∈ S \ {e} and let w(x 1 , . . . , x m ) be a word such that s = w(a 1 , . . . , a m ). Let σ be the sentence
Since H is locally universal, K embeds into H U , whence H U | = σ and thus H | = σ. Take b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ H that witness the truth of σ. Then the mapping a i → b i yields a homomorphism K → H whose restriction to S is not identically the identity of H. Since S is simple, we have that the aformentioned map restricts to an embedding of S into H, as desired.
As a special case of the previous lemma, we have that every simple finitely presented group embeds into every locally universal group; this simpler statement does not need the aformentioned result of Higman and Boone and follows from a simpler version of the previous proof.
Notice that the previous lemma seemingly yields a generalization of Fact 2. Proof. By Fact 2.1.3 together with the fact that exactness is preserved under subgroup, it suffices to find a non-exact finitely generated group with solvable word problem. Such groups exist, e.g. the Gromov monster [7] .
Another generalization of amenability, the Haagerup property, can also never be a property of a locally universal group: We end this subsection by remarking that if a single locally universal group is sofic, then all groups are sofic. Indeed, it is easily verified that the (discrete) ultrapower of a sofic group is sofic; since subgroups of sofic groups are sofic, the observation follows. In particular, if a single e.c. group is sofic, then all groups are sofic. In what follows, we write I ⊆ ǫ [m] to mean that I ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and |I| ≥ (1 − ǫ)m. We set ϕ m,n,ǫ ( x) to be the L-formula
Set ϕ n,ǫ ( x) := m ϕ m,n,ǫ ( x) and σ n,ǫ := ∀ xϕ n,ǫ ( x).
The proof of the following proposition is clear: The sentences σ n,ǫ are prototypical examples of ∀ ∃-sentences, which are special kind of L ω 1 ,ω -sentences 5 . It is known that if P is a ∀ ∃-property and there is a locally universal object with property P, then there is an e.c. object with property P. (For a proof, see, for example, [6, Proposition 2.6], although this is in the context of continuous logic.) The previous proposition, together with the fact that no e.c. group can be amenable, gives a different proof of the fact that no locally universal group can be amenable.
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Preliminaries on model-theoretic forcing.
In this subsection, we outline the idea of model-theoretic forcing (restricted to the case of groups). Our approach follows that of Hodges [9] .
We fix a countably infinite set C. A condition is a finite set p( c) of equations and inequations in the variables c from C.
We consider a two-player game G with ω many rounds defined as follows. The players take turns playing conditions, each time ensuring that the condition being played extends the condition played by the previous player. The outcome of the game is an infinite chain
of conditions whose union we denote by p. We let p e denote the set of equations appearing in p. We set G p := (C | p e ), that is, G p is the group generated by the set C and whose relations are the equations that are played at some point in the game. One refers to G p as the compiled group resulting from the play p of G.
Let P be a property of groups. We say that P is enforceable if the second player has a strategy for G such that, if the second player follows that strategy, then the compiled group will have property P.
The followings facts can be found in [9] as Corollary 3.4.3 and Lemma 2.3.3(e) respectively. (1) It is enforceable that the compiled group be e.c.
(2) (Conjunction lemma) If, for each n ∈ N, P n is an enforceable property, then the conjunction n P n is also enforceable.
If σ is a sentence of L ω 1 ,ω , we write σ to mean that the property "the compiled group believes that σ is true" is enforceable.
If p is a condition, we can consider the game G p defined as above except that the first player is required to play a condition extending p. We say that p forces P if the second player has a strategy for G p such that, if the second player follows that strategy, then the compiled group will have property P. As before, if σ is a sentence of L ω 1 ,ω , we write p σ to mean that p forces the property "the compiled group believes that σ is true." We will need the easy observation that if ¬σ, then for all conditions p, we have that p σ. Proof. If σ n,ǫ held for all n ∈ N and all ǫ > 0, then, by Fact 3.1.1(2), amenability would be enforceable. By Fact 3.1.1(1), being e.c. is also enforceable, whence it follows that there would be an amenable e.c. group, yielding a contradiction.
We need the following fundamental result from model-theoretic forcing: 
Proof. This is nearly the statement of [9, Theorem 3.4.4] (stated for an arbitrary theory), except that the Φ n 's are allowed to contain constants from C, whence so is ψ. In case that the Φ n 's are actually L-formulae, we can assume that ψ is also an L-formula by existentially quantifying out any mention of elements from C.
The following is the main theorem announced in the introduction; it follows immediately from Theorem 3.2.1 and Fact 3.2.2:
There is an n ∈ N, ǫ > 0, and an existential L-formula ψ( x), where
Remark 3.2.4. Let ψ( x) be as in the statement of the previous theorem. Then ψ( x) has infinitely many realizations in every e.c. group, whence we have "concrete" witnesses to the fact that e.c. groups are not amenable.
We can in fact find "densely" many such ψ( x). First, one more fundamental forcing fact, which is a special case of [9, Theorem 3.4.7] : Fact 3.2.5. For any L ω 1 ,ω -sentence σ, we have that either σ or ¬σ. Corollary 3.2.6. There is n ∈ N and ǫ > 0 such that ¬σ n,ǫ . For such n and ǫ and for any condition p, we have that p σ n,ǫ .
Let us recap in purely group theoretic terms: Corollary 3.2.7. There is n ∈ N and ǫ > 0 such that: for any system Σ 0 ( w) of equations and inequations in the finite set of variables w, there is a system Σ( w, z, x) of equations and inequations, where w, z, and x are finite disjoint sets of variables and x has length n, such that Σ 0 ⊆ Σ and such that, for any group G and any a ∈ G n if Σ ( w, z, a) has a solution in G, then there is no ( a, ǫ) -Følner subset of G.
3.3.
On the asymptotic undefinability of the existence of Følner sets. We say that a group G is uniformly amenable if there is a function Φ : N × (0, 1) → N such that, given any subset F of G of size at most n and any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there is a (F, ǫ)-Følner subset of G of size at most Φ(n, ǫ).
There are amenable groups that are not uniformly amenable, e.g. S ∞ := n S n . 7 Theorem 3.3.1. There is n 0 ∈ N and ǫ 0 > 0 such that, for any n ≥ n 0 and any ǫ ≤ ǫ 0 , there can be no first-order formula equivalent in all groups to ¬ϕ n,ǫ ( x).
Proof. Let G be an amenable group that is not uniformly amenable as witnessed by n 0 ∈ N and ǫ 0 > 0. Suppose n ≥ n 0 and ǫ ≤ ǫ 0 and that T | = ∀ x(ψ( x) → ¬ϕ n,ǫ ( x)). Then the set of formulae {¬ϕ m,n,ǫ ( x) : m ∈ N} ∪ {¬ψ( x)} is finitely satisfiable in G (since G is amenable). Thus, there is a ∈ (G U ) n such that ¬ϕ n,ǫ ( a) holds while ψ( a) fails.
